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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between institutional quality and eco-
nomic performance the 32 Mexican states over the period 2003 – 2010. Using
dynamic panel GMM estimation and the Fraser Institutes index of economic
freedom, I find that freedom has an ambiguous impact on economic growth and
improvements undermines employment. These results are corroborated with dy-
namic OLS model and panel fixed and random effects models.
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Introduction
The role institutions play in determining economic performance has increasingly at-
tracted interest in the empirical literature over the past few decades. The inclusion of
total factor productivity or the Solow residual as an unobserved component in tradi-
tional growth models, such as the the Solow (1956) or Swan (1956) models of economic
growth, leave many questions unanswered regarding how country specific unobserved
‘fixed effects’ contribute to growth. As a potential answer to these questions North and
Thomas (1973) and North (1989) argued that well developed, and liberal, institutions
contribute to economic growth via incentives, property rights, and the reduction of
transaction costs. North (1990) further developed a theory of the impacts of institu-
tional change on economic growth.
However, identifying and quantifying institutional quality is understandably diffi-
cult. In past two decades, however, two separate indices of economic freedom, the
Heritage Index and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) have
quantified “economic freedom” as measured by various institutional sub-components.
While these indices may not have specifically been constructed as measuring institu-
tional quality, they have become increasingly popular as institutional variables in em-
pirical applications. Dawson (2007) provides an overview of the use economic freedom
as a stand-in for institutions and notes that prior to the construction of these indices
in the empirical growth literature. de Haan et al. (2006) also note that authors may
be reluctant to use them given the difficulty of quantifying economic freedom and/or
because of the perceived political bent, i.e. libertarian, of the organizations producing
them.
In this paper, I utilize the concept of economic freedom as proxy for institutional
quality across Mexican states (Estados Unidos Mexicanos) to investigate their impact
on economic performance. For economic performance I use the level gross state product
(GSP) and state specific unemployment rates as measures of long and ‘medium’ run
macroeconomic variables, respectively. The use of GSP ties this research with the
empirical growth literature while the unemployment rate acts as a measure of labor
market performance.
There has been considerable of research on the relationship between institutions and
economic growth. North (1989, 1990) and North and Thomas (1973) essentially argue
that well defined and enforceable legal structures are necessary for protecting property
rights and well operating markets. Barro (1991) looked at a panel of 98 countries and
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found that growth is positively associated with political stability and negatively with
market distortions.
Others include, Sala-I-Martin (1997), using economic growth or per capita real GDP
as the dependent variable. The institutional variables considered include: religion,
(Barro and McCleary [2003] and McCleary [2008]); language as human capital (Lee,
2012); corruption (Mo [2001] and Podobnik et al. [2008]); war (Blomberg and Hess,
2006), etc. The general consensus is somewhat intuitive: countries with less autocratic
rule, be it government or religious, less corruption, and less disruption have better
economic performance than those that do.1
Acemoglu et al. (2005) corroborate the finds of North (1989, 1990) and North and
Thomas (1973) in that the protection of property rights and the allocation of resources
are necessary for economic growth. More recently, Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) use
dynamic panel GMM methods to investigate institutional changes on economic growth
over 82 countries. They construct three different institutional indices – Institutionalized
Social Technologies (IST), Factor of Institutional and Policy Rents (FIPR), and Factor
of Political Rent (FPR) – and demonstrate that improvements to IST and FIPR pos-
itively contribute to growth whereas FPR is not a statistically significant contributor
to growth.
Recently, the intranational effects of institutional differences on state or province
economic performance have been given more attention. For example, Ashby and Sobel
(2006) find evidence that improvements to institutions across US states – as measured
by the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of North America index, see Stansel and
McMahon (2013) – positively impacts growth and reduces income inequality. Bennet
and Vedder (2013) use fixed effect models across the US states and find increases in
freedom reduce income inequality. In Mexican states, Ashby et al. (2013) use a simple
OLS with lagged dependent variables and demonstrate a positive relationship between
real wages, growth, and economic freedom.
In the role of institutions in labor markets markets across US states has been in-
vestigated by Garrett and Rhine (2011). They adopt North’s measure of institutional
quality as protection of property rights and the rule of law and demonstrate a positive
relationship between labor growth and freedom. In a panel of the 50 US states over the
period 1981-2009 Heller and Stephenson (2014) show that more freedom is associated
1A special edition of the Quarterly Journal of Economics (1993), was dedicated to various deter-
minants of economic growth including institutional differences.
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with lower unemployment rates and greater labor participation.
Freedom has been used as proxy for institutional soundness in a variety of other
settings such as trade (Depken and Sonora, 2002, Assane and Chiang, 2014, and Sonora,
2014); Olympic success (Ruseski and Maresova, 2014); and income inequality (Ashby
and Sobel, 2006, Apergis, Dincer and Payne, 2014). A survey of the use of economic
freedom can be found in the Introduction to “Symposium on Economic Freedom”, Hall
and Lawson (2014).
This paper continues to work on intranational impacts of freedom on the growth
of states in a single country. Considering the impacts of freedom on growth on states
reduces the magnitude of unobservable fixed effects that might be present in a panel of
countries. The use of a single country also allows the analysis to more fully concentrate
on differences in economic freedom across states as intra-country analysis allows us to
“correct for” differences in languages, religion, central government and bank practices,
the military, etc. While a country such as Mexico does have significant state specific
idiosyncracies, they are relatively homogeneous as compared to analyses which utilize
country wide data.
In this paper, I use dynamic panel GMM methods and demonstrate that improve-
ments to freedom have an ambiguous impact on economic growth and exacerbate unem-
ployment across Mexican states. The results here are similar to those found in Ashby
et al. (2013), but also extends their research by using more dynamically appropriate
modelling and investigating the impacts of freedom on labor markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 outlines the empirical
strategy and discusses the results; Section 2 reviews the data used and provides some
descriptive statistics; Section 3 presents the results of the OLS and fixed and random
effect models, 4 introduces the dynamic panel methods used and provides the results.
Finally, Section 5 provides some brief summary remarks.
1 Empirical Model
We begin our discussion by specifying a standard dynamic pooled-panel model given
by:
yit = α + ρyit−1 + θefwit + x′itγ + λt + εit; |ρ| ∈ (0, 1) (1)
where y is a measure of economic performance, given alternatively as the natural log of
state real gross state product (GSP) and the unemployment rate, ur, efw is the state
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economic freedom index. x is a vector of control variables
x = (s, z)′
where s represents Mexican state specific controls:
s = (Education, Infant Mortality, Net Income, Maquiladora)′.
Education is the percent of the state population which has graduated from high school
and infant mortality is infant deaths per 1,000 residents. These two variables capture
human capital stocks in each state. Net Income is after tax income per family, which
captures differences in Mexican incomes across the states, similar in flavor to initial con-
ditions, and differences in labor productivity. Maquiladora represents the maquiladora
production for each state, which can be considered as a proxy for FDI in each state
as well as local taxes and subsidies for foreign producers. z is a vector of country
characteristic time dummy variables,
z = (Drug War, Recession)′.
Drug war escalation began in 2008 when then President Caldero´n enlarged the Mexican
military’s role in going after drug lords of the largest Mexican cartels. While the war was
predominately waged in the states which were the ‘home-base’ to the drug cartels, the
effects of the government’s efforts were likely felt throughout Mexico: WAR = 1 if t ≥
2008 and 0 otherwise.2 During the sample period, Mexico faced two recessions, in
2003 and 2008-09, similar to the timing of the US’s Great Recession. REC=1 if t =
2003, 2008−2009 and 0 otherwise. λt is a time fixed effect. εit is a random disturbance.
I will consider two versions of equation (1), one which includes country dummies z 6= 0
and another which restricts z = 0 to concentrate solely on state specific control.
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable accounts for dynamic changes in the
economy, i.e. economic growth and/or changes in labor markets and helps correct for
potential serial correlation. In addition it also acts as a proxy for omitted variables.
Because of the relatively short sample time, a lag length of one is selected in this model.
It also controls for a feedback effect. There is considerable evidence that economic
2States which have cartel influence are: Baja California, Durango, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Chihuahua,
Michoaca´n, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leo´n, Veracruz, Coahuila, Jalisco, San Luis Potos´ı, Nayarit, Zacatecas,
Oaxaca, Morelos, and Sonora (no relation).
4
freedom and, particularly, growth suffer from the endogeneity issues, specifically the
simultaneity problem.
Of most interest is the estimated coefficient on the economic freedom index, efw,
which, ex ante, we anticipate should be positive, θˆ > 0 when income is used as the de-
pendent variable and θˆ < 0 for unemployment. This model is similar to regressions run
in Ashby et al. (2013) for Mexican states. However, their specification only controlled
for one state specific variable, average years of schooling. Ashby and Sobel (200x) ran
a similar model in their study of the impacts of freedom on economic outcomes in US
states.
The specification in equation (1) was estimated using a variety of pooled-panel
estimates. We begin the analysis with pooled OLS estimation with time fixed effects.
Next, the model is estimated using panel fixed and random effect models, nested in
equation (1). If α = 0 and
εit = µi + uit;uit ∼ N(0, σ2u) (2)
we have the fixed effect model where µi is a time invariant unobserved state fixed
effect and uit is a random disturbance, with the orthogonality condition E(µi, εit) = 0
equation (1) is the fixed effect model. On the other hand, if µi is random with
µi ∼ iid(0, σ2µ)
E(µi, xit) = 0, and
α = 0
equation (1) is the random effects model. E(µi, xit) = 0 represents the orthogonality
condition that the fixed effects and regressors are uncorrelated
2 Data and Characteristics
The sample period covers the years 2003 – 2010. The primary reason for this sample
period is the availability of the Mexican state freedom data, which is from the Economic
Freedom of North America (Ashby et al., 2012), published by the Fraser Institute. The
overall index is the average of four components: Area 1, the Size of Government;
Area 2, Takings and Discriminatory Taxation; Area 3, Labor Market Freedom; and
Area 4, Legal System and Property Rights. Each of these components are themselves
constructed from subcomponents. Ashby et al. (2012) and Ashby et al. (2013) for a
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more complete overview of the construction of each index.3 For more information on
the individual state freedom data see Ashby et al. (2013).
The state specific variables are available from the Banco de Informacio´n INEGI
at the Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa, or INEGI, (2013). Gross state
product (GSP), from INEGI, is in nominal terms and is converted to real using the
Mexican state average (national) consumer price index available from the OECD (2013)
as is the recession indicator dummy. The remaining state data is from INEGI. The dates
for the drug war are from news sources.
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. The two dependent variables are
the real gross state product (RGSP) and unemployment rate (UR).4 For the state spe-
cific independent variables the state freedom index (MX-EFW), high school graduation
rates (HiSch), net personal income (NetInc), and infant mortality rates (InfMor) are
in natural logs. The two country-wide structural controls are recession (REC) and
drug war (DRUG) are time dummy variables. Alternative control variables of such
as illiteracy, number of doctors, median age, number of emigrants, and percentage of
population employed in the primary sector were also considered, however, these data
are unavailable for most of the sample period. For maquiladora production (MAQ),
I use an index (2003 = 100) of physical output for each state relative to Mexico City
(Distrito Federal, DF), MAQ = MAQi/MAQDF . The data is quarterly and I use the
fourth quarter index to capture the level of maquiladora output.
For comparison purposes, Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for the US state
freedom indices (US-EFW) over the same period, also from the Fraser Institute. One
issue discussed with research in the impacts of economic freedom on economic growth
in the US is that there may be insufficient variability in the state freedom indices to
provided efficient estimates of the impacts of economic freedom on growth, see Ashby
and Sobel (2006). Beginning the discussion with the freedom the Mexican and US
indices we an see that, overall, the Mexican freedom mean is lower than in the US but
has higher overall volatility as measured in standard deviation.
Figure 1 shows the intra-year standard deviation for each country. As can be seen
over the sample period freedom across Mexican states diverges, with a slight levelling
3Individual observations for each of the four components is only available for 2010.
4In the growth literature, real per capita gross state product is frequently the preferred measure,
however, per capita income is unavailable in Mexican states for all years in the sample period. An
alternative labor market indicator is either total employed in, say, manufacturing, but, similarly, data
is unavailable for each year in the sample.
6
out 2009 – 2010 over the sample period whereas across US states it converges. It should
be noted that the financial crisis and Great Recession, which impacted both countries,
falls in within the sample period. Secondly, Mexico ended its three year recession
in September of 2003 which may account for the relatively low standard deviation of
freedom in the first two sample years.
Table 2 has simple correlation coefficients of the variables and their p−values. As
can be seen economic freedom is statistically significantly correlated with both real GSP
(RGSP) and unemployment. Freedom is also significantly correlated with all the other
variables, except the recession, lending credence to potential endogeneity issues.
Figures 2 and 3 are scatter plots for lnRGSP and the unemployment rate with
an simple ‘unconditional’ regression fitted line. As can be seen, there appears to be a
positive slope with respect to each of the regressand and lnEFW .
3 Results
Results of panel fixed and random effects models are presented in Tables 3 and 4.5
Two versions of each regression are presented, including a lagged dependent variable
and an alternative which restricts ρ = 0 in equation (1). Table 3 presents results
including country wide control variables, z. As a robustness check, and to observe the
effects of institutional factors on economic performance without country-wide effects,
the model which restricts z = 0 results are in Table 4. Coefficients and their p−values,
in parenthesis, are presented as is the adjusted R20, stars are used to denote significance.
Each table also has the the p values of the Hausman test, p(H) to determine which of
the panel regressions is the “best” model. While this test is not specifically intended to
test for the appropriate panel model, low estimated p(H)−values, at, say, p(H) ≤ 5%,
are generally interpreted as a rejection of the random effects model. First we observe
the Hausman statistics generally rejects the random effect models.
First perusing the model which includes country effects, Table 3, we see some in-
teresting results. Concentrating first on the country wide structural dummies we see
that both are highly statistically significant with the appropriate sign, negative.6 For
GSP the drug war and recession contributed to a decline in income, while both con-
5Pooled OLS regressions with time fixed effects were also conducted, with relatively little change
in the results. Results available on request.
6Given Mexico’s trade ties to the US, I also tried using a US recession dummy variable, but this
had no effect on the results.
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tributed to gains in unemployment. The effects of maquiladora production on income
and unemployment are also intuitively attractive. Statistically significant positive im-
pacts on GSP, with a negative, albeit insignificant, impact on unemployment. On the
other hand, infant mortality and education likewise reveal some confounding implica-
tions. A high school education decreases GSP, strongly with the fixed effect model,
and increases unemployment, significantly with the random effects model, though the
Hausman statistic does “reject” this model.
Turning our attention to the variable of interest, economic freedom, we see it has a
positively significant impact, with the random effects model, on unemployment, which
is contrary to ex ante expectations, as one of the components of freedom is labor
market freedom which should imply more fluid labor markets and less unemployment,
with estimated responses about 2.0, though this can be partially explained by the
relatively low skill level for production in rural states. On the other hand, institutional
improvements do positively impact GSP, though it is only statistically significant when
the lagged dependent variable is not include, estimated elasticities are in the 0.2 range.
When we restrict the country control to zero, z = 0, the results are dramatically
different, see Table 4. In all cases, the Hausman test favors the fixed effect model.
Maquiladora production is statistically positively significant for GSP, with estimates
between about 0.2 and 0.5. None of the estimates are significant for their impact
on unemployment, moreover, the signs are predominately positive. Contrary to the
results presented in Table 3, infant mortality now is significant with expected response,
positive for GSP and negative for unemployment, but high school eduction becomes
less relevant.
The absence of country effects increases the importance of institutions on GSP, with
all the estimates statistically significant and positive, particularly using the, preferred,
fixed effect model, with estimates between 0.2 and 0.6. Reassuringly, estimates for the
effect of institutions on unemployment are negative, though they are not statistically
meaningful.
4 Dynamic Panel Methods
However, as discussed above, growth models have endogenously determined variables
such that y ⇔ x which leads to the simultaneity problem. This “chicken-and-egg” ques-
tion is particularly acute in growth models which use economic freedom. In this context
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higher levels of output lead to a desire for more economic freedom while concurrently
freedom improves conditions for growth. For example, lower taxes provide an incentive
to increase investment and, hence, growth which, in turn, leads to incentive to im-
prove economic freedom for a variety of reasons such as rent seeking behavior, political
influence, and for more “laissez-faire” reasons such as a low inflationary environment
requires less central bank heavy-handedness.
Dawson (2003) demonstrates that while freedom does Granger-cause output when
using levels, when the variables are converted to growth variables the causality goes in
both directions, as do Chong and Calderon (2000) and Farr et al. (1998), in their paper
on freedom and economic well being.
Econometrically, as is well documented, fixed effect models with a lagged depen-
dent variable biases the estimated coefficients, given that E(yit−1, εit) 6= 0. Without
any exogenous regressors Nickell (1981) demonstrated that ρ is biased by 1/T so that
bias(ρˆ) → 0 as T → ∞. Because of this, the panels discussed above are only useful
with a large time dimension.
Given these caveats I employ generalized method-of–moments (GMM) based IV
estimation which has advantages over standard IV estimation in that it is more ef-
ficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity. While this may be less of a problem in
a single nation, given, in particular, that we use GSP and not per capita GSP there
is a potential for considerable heteroskedasticity. Moreover, Judson and Owen (1999)
demonstrate that the least squares dummy (LSDV) model, i.e fixed effect model with
lagged dependent variables, performs badly with small T . They show that the GMM
estimator works well with small T while the Anderson and Hsiao (1981), hereafter AH,
estimator performs well as T →∞.
To remove the panel fixed effects we can employ a dynamic framework by first
converting equation (1) into first differences, as in AH:
∆yit = δ1∆yit−1 + δ2∆efwit + ∆x′itδ3 + ∆εit, (3)
where ∆ is the one period difference operator. By construction, this specification still
contains correlation between the errors and lagged dependent variable. As such, we can
employ an IV approach using the second or higher order lagged dependent variable as
a valid instrument. This strategy can be employed even if ϕit follows an AR(1) process
by using higher order lagged dependent variables for instruments. This transformation
reduces potential biases from omitted variables and the state specific fixed effects, which
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in standard IV models would be nested in the panel error term in equation (2), µi.
However, as outlined above, Judson and Owen (1999) found the AH estimator
performs badly with small T . Arellano and Bond (AB, 1991) use a GMM approach
to exploit the larger amount of information contained in the sample. They argue that
AH is consistent but fails to account for all potential orthogonality conditions. In
this approach they include lagged levels of the endogenous variable, in differenced form
and the exogenous variables. Later Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998), hereafter AB − BB, demonstrated that lagged levels are poor instruments for
differenced variables, as in equation (3). They modified the AB model to also include
lagged differenced variables.
Dynamic Panel Results
Dynamic panel GMM estimates can be found in Tables 5, including the country effects,
and 5, without country dummies. Estimated coefficients, denoted δˆ, and their respective
p−values, p(δˆ) – calculated using two-step GMM standard errors – are presented side by
side. Given that most of the estimates are highly significant, I have forgone the standard
use of ∗s to denote significance. As a measure of overall model fit, the p−value of the
overall Wald, p(W ), statistic is also tabulated.
First, we note that all estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level or better
except for the elasticity of GSP and economic freedom using the AB model. In Table
5 we start by examining the overall Mexican structural dummies, REC and DRUG,
estimates have the hypothesized sign and are significant. As are estimates for the
maquiladoras. Estimates for the two human capital proxies – infant mortality and
education – raise questions. With respect to GSP the estimates are negative while for
unemployment, coefficients are positive. For GSP the education elasticities are about
0.06 while for unemployment they are about 3.0.7 Mortality rate elasticities are similar,
but of a larger magnitude. Net income estimates have the hypothesized sign and are
significant.
Institutional elasticities are, with one exception, strongly significant. The estimates
using GSP are dependent on the method, with the AB model the institution coefficient
is positive, but not statistically meaningful. On the other hand, with the AB − BB
model, the elasticity is negative and strongly significant. For the unemployment rate,
7I also experimented with secondary school rates given that returns to education are non-linear,
however, the results were similar.
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once again, the elasticity is positive, more proof that unemployment is positively im-
pacted by higher freedom.
When we restrict country wide impacts to zero, the result change dramatically.
Again, the majority of estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% level, and the
majority of the estimates have the predicted sign. The maquiladora industry elasticity
is positive for GSP and negative for unemployment. It is notable that the AB −
BB maquiladora estimates with respect to unemployment are about four times larger
than than in the AB specification. The human capital variables also fall in line with
expectations, with the exception of infant mortality and GSP, where estimates are
contrary to a priori conjectures. The signs for net income are as expected, however, for
GSP regressor they are not significant.
For the freedom variable, estimates do fall in line with expectations. Its elasticity
with respect to GSP and unemployment is positive and negative, respectively. In both
cases, the AB estimator is about twice, in absolute value, of the AB −BB coefficient,
with estimates 0.52 and 0.19 for GSP and -7.45 and -2.92 for unemployment.
These results for this paper provoke a couple of questions. First, and most impor-
tantly, is the positive effect of economic freedom on unemployment rate, contrary to
Heller and Stephenson’s (2014) results for US states. Secondly, the estimates for the
human capital variables appear to be sensitive to the estimation technique employed
and are frequently contrary to expectations. And third, the inclusion of country wide
structural dummies has a significant impact on the results, affecting both the sign and
statistical significance of the estimates. For example, institutional elasticity estimates
for the unemployment rate switch signs from positive, with the country dummies, to
negative, without them.
5 Summary
In this paper I explore the economic effects of institutions on economic performance
across Mexican states using the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America
index as a proxy for institutional quality. This paper uses new data and continues,
and considerably extends, the empirical work by Ashby et al (2013). Given the variety
of unobservable state specific fixed effects, it might be tempting to solely explore this
relationship with a panel, however, research has shown that economic performance and
institutional improvements are endogenous, especially the freedom indices, see Dawson
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(2003). Therefore, in addition to fixed and random effect panel methods, I also the
employ Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) dynamic panel models.
Results show that institutions, as measured by economic freedom, do have a sta-
tistically significant impact on economic performance. However, some of the results of
the analysis are confounding. In particular, the a priori expectation of freedom’s im-
pact on unemployment would be unambiguously negative. However, the results change
when country wide dummy variables are present in the analysis. When country specific
variables are included the estimates are positive, contrary to theory. However, then
the country effects are excluded, the estimated signs switch. This result is robust to
various model specifications.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max N × T
RGSP 12.565 0.818 11.087 14.656 256
UR 3.465 1.464 0.500 8.100 256
MX-EFW 1.896 0.106 1.631 2.100 256
NetInc 15.425 0.710 13.477 17.520 248
HiSch 4.134 0.154 3.669 4.443 256
InfMor 2.711 0.184 2.272 3.203 256
MAQ 0.008 0.054 -0.132 0.168 256
DRUG 0.250 0.434 0.000 1.000 256
REC 0.375 0.485 0.000 1.000 256
US-EFW 1.916 0.096 1.629 2.104 400
16
Table 2: Correlation
RGSP UR EFW HiSch NetInc InfMor MAQ DRUG
UR 0.189 1.000
(0.002)
EFW 0.306 0.139 1.000
(0.000) (0.027)
HiSch 0.068 0.563 0.106 1.000
(0.280) (0.000) (0.092)
NetInc 0.761 0.172 0.217 -0.057 1.000
(0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.372)
InfMor -0.057 -0.445 -0.177 -0.535 0.053 1.000
(0.361) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.404)
MAQ -0.047 0.189 0.239 0.160 0.015 -0.308 1.000
(0.458) (0.002) (0.000) (0.011) (0.809) (0.000)
DRUG -0.059 0.498 -0.182 0.157 0.170 -0.337 0.199 1.000
(0.344) (0.000) (0.003) (0.012) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001)
REC -0.017 0.089 -0.076 -0.069 0.052 -0.021 -0.035 0.149
0.792) (0.157) (0.226) (0.271) (0.418) (0.742) (0.577 (0.017)
Notes: p−values of statistical significance of the null hypothesis of no correlation
are in parenthesis.
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Figures
Figure 1: Economic Freedom: Standard Deviation
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Figure 2: ln(RGSP ) and EFW
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Figure 3: UR and EFW
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